The XXth Century Political History of Russia: lecture materials

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Информация о книге

УДК 94(47)

ББК 63.3(2)

В78

The authors:

Bordyugov Gennady (PhD), Head of the International Board of the Association of Researchers of Russian Society (AIRO – XXI). Since 1988, he has been teaching courses of History at Lomonosov Moscow State University. Since 1992 – invited professor at several foreign universities.

Devyatov Sergey (PhD), Head of the Department of Russian History of the ХХ – ХХl centuries at Lomonosov Moscow State University Historical Faculty, professor at Russian University for the Humanities and the Moscow Pedagogical State University. Invited professor at Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, National Nuclear Research University «MEPhI». Lecturing on Russian History, Historiography and the History of the Moscow Kremlin.

Kotelenets Elena (PhD), since 1977 – professor at Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia. Lectures on Russian History, Historiography and Political Studies.

Translation editor – Кupriyanova Мilana.

The XXth Century Political History of Russia presents lecture materials for academics working with undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate students as well as researchers of Russian history.

The chapters are an unusual insight into the Russian past, which makes the readers think, analyze and also reconsider some events of the Russian history. It is an exciting blend of stories of the past and future trends, allowing to make forecasts and predictions.

УДК 94(47)

ББК 63.3(2)

© Бордюгов Г., Девятов С., Котеленец Е., 2015

ООО "Проспект", 2015

PREFACE

In the middle of last century, many held that the 20th century marked the beginning of a Russian era. Others discussed a «Russian miracle», referring to the rise of the Soviet Union thanks to the communist idea. During the 20th century, Russia found an alternative to capitalism as a result of the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917. Industrial modernization and fantastic social mobility not only dramatically changed the image of the country, but also helped to win the mortal battle against Nazi Germany. After World War II, interest in the Soviet Union rose significantly all around the world. The communist idea was changing from a utopian idea into a palpable reality. Both common people and intellectual elites were awaiting the outcome of the «cold war» between the two systems of world order: the USSR and the USA.

«Free market capitalism» was drawing lessons from the world wars, crises, the Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s, and protests by left-minded youth in the 1960s. Meanwhile, «elements of socialism» could clearly be seen in the new course of Franklin Roosevelt and Ludwig Erhard, based on expanding state control over the economy and extensive social programs. However, new challenges, primarily caused by a scientific-technical revolution, did not prevent the West from turning to Reaganomics and Thatcherism – that is, to neo-liberalism – starting in the 1980s.

In Russia, the Bolsheviks resorted to violence as a tool of building a new regime and changing society and individuals. As a result, the country received a state-controlled economy based on the administrative mobilization of people and resources, the GULAG (labor camps), the Great Terror and intellectual isolation. Khrushchev’s «thaw» and Gorbachev’s «perestroika» were attempts to get out of the historical traps the country had fallen into as a result of lingering adherence to Stalin’s and Brezhnev’s views of socialism. In 1991, the country abruptly changed course, towards the restoration of a neo-liberal form of capitalism.

These lectures provide a new understanding and new vision of the dynamics of the historical process in 20th century Russia in all its complexity. They also explain why Russia, in spite of having enormous human potential and natural resources, faced such difficulties in development. Russia is portrayed as an integral part of world history, while at the same time its historical peculiarities as compared to both the East and West.

The articles and reference materials are addressed to our colleagues: university teachers and research staff working with foreign undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate students. They will also be of interest to people studying Russian history and to visitors and others who want to get a deeper insight into the Russia’s past while also learning about trends in the development and the chosen paths of Russia in the 20th century.

We are offering our interpretation of a people’s way of life and mentality, of a country’s power structures and regimes, economic policy models, and vision of the future as well as our view of key events of the last century. The book is based on lectures and reports delivered by the authors in universities and research centers in Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, the USA, France, South Korea and Japan.

INTRODUCTION

Theme 1

THE STUDY OF MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY: MAIN CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS

The academic study of history has been significantly reconsidered and retooled during the last two decades. Scholars had to solve a whole number of questions. This process was accompanied by «the struggle for the past» and the filling in of so-called «blank spots», as well as by changes in the subject matter and value orientations of Russian scholars, the destruction of previously existing historical hierarchies, the beginning of coexistence between history and the Internet, market penetration in science and rivalry for the best «packaging» of historical knowledge.

The main reason for understanding the principle characteristics and trends of these transformations is to find out why historical science still attracts public attention in new conditions, and why it is used not only as science but also as a tool for making sense of current events.

Since the middle of the 1980s scholars have been studying Soviet history on the basis of the interests and priorities of Perestroika, elaborating historical patterns according to current political tendencies. While the official state policy was destroying the past, these patterns met the requirements of historical science itself. Researchers were clearing the historical research field of old dogmas and stereotypes. Nobody realized the possible pitfalls of this intellectual revolution. The review of the past was based not on historical science itself but on external factors. Political essays were filling the ideological vacuum. However, the approaches of popular commentators were more political than analytical. Historiography itself was only prepared to remove old concepts taken from Stalin’s Short Course and to replace them with others elaborated in the conditions of a new political situation.

The first animated discussions were actually aimed not at broadening historical science itself, but at «schematizing» it. Some researchers defended and wanted to conserve the old «patterns,» others wanted to destroy them. But neither group went outside the bounds of old stereotypes, stable traditions and claims to have a monopoly on truth. The result of these politicized discussions about the past resulted in a vulgar squabble over whether the country had been moving in the wrong direction for more then seventy years. At the least, this was a positive phenomena because the appearance of many «patterns» and explanatory concepts offered real choices and opened room for debate.

Some historians suggested looking for so called «big algorithms» (that is, large-scale structural imperatives of varying kinds – PTC) of Soviet history in the concepts that «had developed themselves» or penetrated Soviet historical science from western sociology. They could give a fundamental explanation of the historical phenomenon of Russia in the 20th century. These «big algorithms» include: «rapid economic development designed to overtake the West» or industrial modernization, «large-scale revolution», «the algorithm of empire» and the «doctrinal» algorithm. Behind each of them, there is a concept that had already been well elaborated in western sociology and historiography.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the «doctrinal» algorithm was the most popular. This approach reflects the recent past as the realization of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks initial political doctrine. It deals with the different ways Marxist concepts were adapted to fit the Stalinist political system. Today these ideas represent a specific Russian modification of the «totalitarian» approach developed by American Sovietologists of the «Cold War» period.

There are many facts and events in the history of the 20th century that could explain the first algorithm, connected with the modernization pattern, and the «big revolution» algorithm. As for the first algorithm, since the end of the 1960s political scientists had been elaborating concepts explaining the developmental particularities of the second-tier capitalist countries, including Russia. The second algorithm was used by the Bolsheviks’ opponents, such as the Mensheviks, the National-Bolsheviks and the Trotskyists. This algorithm was also supported by those scientists who doubt the revolutionary character of the October Revolution of 1917 and refused to include it among the «great revolutions.» Whatever the attitude toward the Russian revolution, this approach did provide a scientific interpretation of the political extremism, violence and terror that occurred. It also allowed historians to trace the revolution’s ascent, regression and decline – that is, its «Thermidorian» and «Bonapartist» phases. The same can be said of the «algorithm of empire,» which can also be used to explain the birth, development, and collapse of the Russian and Soviet imperial systems.

The «grand algorithms» at best could form a clear historical picture of social development as a whole, but they could not deal with the analysis of concrete historical periods. They cannot explain many seemingly particular questions. This means that we need some «crossover» from global historiographical schemes to particular historical descriptions. It is necessary to find the turning points, notably the periods of fundamental change in the historical interaction of the «big algorithms,» when some algorithms come to the foreground and become determinative and others disappear or become dormant.

For the description of past crucial and routine turning points we can use Hegel’s concepts of «epic» and «prosaic» world conditions. According to Hegel, in its development, society not only goes through various phases, but through comparatively concentrated periods of high social tension and concentrated contradictions as well. They indicate the «crucial moments» of history. Some «crucial moments» develop into «epic» phases leading to great social progress. Others become moments when tactical choices are made concerning ways and means to advance society. The analysis of critical moments allows us to understand how the very nature of societal movement is changing or might change, how social contradictions interact, and what the relative strength among the «grand algorithms» appears to be.

During a period of crisis or social confrontation, we see the destruction of the habitual patterns of mass behavior. We see political extremism spilling out into the historical arena, giving rise to an atmosphere of intolerance and confrontation. Unfortunately, we know far too little about these problems which are so significant for the comprehension of the phenomenon «Russia in the 20th century.» It is important to understand why some crises lead to liberalization of the regime while others lead to its regeneration on even harsher foundations.

Political mechanisms of solving social crises as well as forms of social consolidation and stability differ greatly in conditions of «open» and «closed» political life. Historians have only just begun to study the real causes of the appearance in Russia of the one-party dictatorship, its social functions and concrete historical forms.

The events of 1991 and 1993 intensified discussions about the methodological crisis and new types of historiography. Some scientists even invited their colleagues to follow the «totalitarian» approach for the reason that it had prevailed in the West over so – called «revisionists.» Others were convinced of the advantages of the «civilization»-approach (with its ideological neutrality) over the «stages of development»-approach. While political scientists debating, postmodernism began to dominate the foreground. Postmodernism cast doubt on the necessity of history as science. Earlier, society had been looking for universal historical concepts. Historians freely used such concepts as «people,» «class,» «nation,» «state» etc. However, by the end of the the 20th century, in light of the crisis of modernism, industrial and urban ways of life, and the collapse of many political and intellectual absolutisms, everything has changed. The present is no more a logical result of the forward march of history.

Some scientists saw the way out of crisis in a paradigm shift – the substitution of modernism, with its universal explanatory theories of social development, with postmodernism. Post-structuralism allows us to outline patterns of multidimensional and irregular change. Michigan University Professor P. (full name) Novik said that the «postmodernism era» had dissolved historical time in a diversity of texts and opinions. However, some western researchers (P. Novik, K. Lloyd, J. Applebee, L. Hunt, M. Jacob etc) did not view postmodernism as a new tool of intellectual analysis. On the contrary, they considered it a «tool of control over minds» like Marxism and liberalism. Postmodernism became a mind controlling tool rather than a new tool of intellectual analysis. According to the teachings of postmodernism, historical thinking is destructive, it interferes with the present. Since nothing can be repeated in the world, there is no need to know history. We have to free ourselves from the «burden of history.» Thus the former attractiveness of postmodernism (how to find the meanings and contradictions in a text) turned to an extreme.

The representatives of the «new historical science» justify the search for a new approach through an innovative interpretation of historical objectivity. Every science is based on the interaction of a qualified researcher with an object of investigation. History that can understand and explain the world may still be written (REWRITE). Unlike poststructuralists, practical realists emphasize the ability of words to articulate different forms of interaction between the researcher and object of historical investigation. We can admit that language is a formality, that historians use rhetorical means and that the past has been constructed. However, we can draw a line between the past and the historical view on the past. It may be useful to ask anti-constructivists how to find the hidden meanings in the text. Points of view may be different. However, documents and sources must be carefully checked by different historians. This will facilitate a more positive approach which allows us to locate valid interpretations among the rival opinions on the past (with the existence of different variants of history).

This approach is valuable because of its ways and forms of dealing with the object of investigation. Each generation of historians deals with it in a different way, using notions that are valuable during a concrete period of history. Each generation rewrites history. Meanwhile the historian – a qualified researcher – is not obliged to be an impersonal truth seeker. She must take her own traits into consideration: her character, nationality, gender, and so on. This self-awareness is already a real revolution in historical thinking. Seeking scientific neutrality and objectivity must not turn into a form of religion.

A discussion of new paradigms was seriously complicated by the emergence from underground of «national histories.» In the early 1990s they began to replace State-centered histories of the USSR, which were common at that time. The concept of «national» histories (as opposed to «Soviet» histories) began to predominate in politics as well as in educational systems.

We will try to find an explanation for these phenomena through the examination of the historical circumstances, of the process of so-called nationalization of the popular historical consciousness, through consideration of historians’ inclination for nationalism and elites’ tendency to instrumentalize the past. However, we should emphasize the fact that the concept of «national history» in its sociological meaning is nothing else but a system of knowledge, created by the national school of historiography. It shows varying degrees of ethnocentrism.

For example, the history of France is considered to be the history of the whole population, not the history of the nation as an ethnos. This means that it focuses on the history of the territory and the state (the principle of the «political nation») and less on the history of the formation of the population (of the Gauls, the Teutons, etc.). When it comes to «national» German history it means the history of all the Germans. The Japanese history known as «kokusi» means both the «native history» and the «national history.»

In Russia, «national history» is perceived as a system of knowledge which refers to the past of an ethnos and its cooperation with historical neighbors. The appearance of this concept was caused by the creation of the national idea, which justifies the cultural and political pretensions of the ruling classes. National historians of the Commonwealth of Independent States «change» the history to justify the process of the formation of independent post-Soviet states.

Some kind of rehabilitation of national history began in 1988. Criticism of such notions as «empire» and «imperial thinking» and later of the process of the formation of the Russian Empire as the series of Tsarist Russia’s crimes against peoples, caused in Russian society a peculiar guilt complex about its «imperial» past. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the modification of former complexes and pretensions. «Nationalities» were confronted by the co-existence of old and new identities, including national ones. This provoked an identity crisis and a desire to overcome Russia’s status of being on the historical and cultural periphery, of its role as a nation being driven by outside forces. People started searching for arguments to prove that their achievements were in keeping with the great patterns of world civilization.

Of course not every detail of the national life came to the fore. In the course of reconsidering «their» past, even historians approved of depicting their peoples as heroes and sometimes as victims, they were inclined to make their statehood more ancient, to exaggerate the level of political and social development of ethnic groups, to assert their nation at the neighbors’ expense, and to create a modified pantheon of the outstanding national figures.

Historical circumstances and the «nationalization» of popular historical consciousness automatically consolidated the historians’ inclination toward nationalist ideology and nationalistic movements. Moreover historians often became founders or supporters of nationalist doctrine. German, French, British and Japanese researchers tried to estimate and understand this phenomenon. They created historiography which could substantiate states’ ambitious aspirations. Even the evolution of nationalism became historical, especially when in the 20th century after World War I a new type of nationalism (ethnonationalism) appeared.

There are several stages in the evolution of the national idea in the USSR. Official historiography focused on a class-based and internationalist approach to historical problems. The term «nationalism» was used in a pejorative sense, as a political label to compare it negatively to internationalism. Meanwhile during the first decade after the October Revolution histories were being written in the atmosphere of cooperation between the central government and indigenous elites, which stimulated the nation-building process among large ethnic groups.

In the late 1920s, there emerged a contradiction between the Russian scientific community, which represented the official historiography of the USSR, and national historians of the other Soviet republics. National histories became the equivalent of anti-Marxism or deviation from Bolshevism. Stalin’s reign dealt a serious blow to national elites and cultures, which were consistently and systematically repressed and contained in the context of the assertion of Bolshevik ideological priorities. Stalin’s regime was concerned with the tension among intellectuals. Turning historiography into a way of substantiating Russian greatness was accompanied by the collapse of Lenin’s class-based historiography. The idea of «national» histories was a way to secretly preserve cultural orientations during this period. National historiographies came to function as part of an official Soviet historiography.

After Stalin’s death, political leaders of the country gave up trying to turn Russian patriotism into a total ideology and historiography. That period of time was characterized by reconstruction of the nation, the formation of new national elites and the search for national histories. The ideological system and official historiography supported the domination of the idea of Soviet patriotism.

In the late 1980s national histories obtained the status of official historiographies. A great myth about a new historical community «the Soviet Nation» began to disappear. It was replaced with new historical perceptions on the part of Soviet nationality groups. National histories now offered a way for up and coming political elites to assert themselves. The political elites of post-Soviet states had to create nations with great national traditions. This is why they needed myths that combined the old and the new.

Science has been studying myths for more than two centuries. Researchers began to realize that myths were a valid attempt to make sense of the world and they began to study myths as an important part of culture and a way to perceive people’s consciousness. Myths challenged ideology, and ideology in its turn started to use myths.

Schematization, simplification, simulation of complicated religious and social processes provides a basis for ideological systems (doctrines). Myths reflect rituals as well. Scientific theories try to make something clear through research, examination, and experience, while myths reflect canonical explanations. A theory tries to formulate a law, which is always open to challenge and falsification. A myth is not. It is ideal when myths and scientific theories are balanced. The predominance of myth is dangerous: it is much easier to manipulate people’s consciousness and actions when the irrational dominates (myths always use irrational proofs).

In Russia myths have not only been reconstructed, but have become a strange mixture of pre-revolutionary, Soviet and post-Soviet myths. They prevent us from approaching actual history, as ideology did before. These old/new myths operate as a support, identity, orientation, protection and demarcation. These functions are neutral but they can become positive or negative according to the situation. Myths can soften crises; they let us deal with all the contradictions and complications of reforms. However they can be used and they are used to achieve certain goals, to take people under control.

Political myths, myths created by and about the ruling class, are of great contemporary interest. They became a distinctive feature of the twentieth century. Political and ideological myths have a tendency to create imagery of a new reality, to determine people’s behavior. Sometimes history chooses as a leading myth a notion advanced by the authorities, such as «enlightened power» or the «power of an iron fist»; sometimes state ideology portrayed the country as a «united and indivisible Russia», or Moscow as the «Third Rome.» The USSR created its own «sacred history» with its own «precursors,» like the «revolutionary events of 1905», with its own predecessors («revolutionary democrats» of the nineteenth century), with its prophets, ascetics and martyrs, its rituals and ceremonies. The October Revolution provided an opportunity to create a new world. History then had to describe the fight against domestic and foreign enemies (the «continuation of class struggle»), and the «era of battles» (The Great Patriotic War). According to Soviet ideology, Stalin was not only the successor of Lenin, he was Lenin’s incarnation: «Stalin is Lenin today.»