PLATO

5 Cratylus

Overview: This dialogue is about the study of language and the giving of names to things. The discussants are trying to determine what the source of the name’s correctness is, when an item is named. This was a very popular field of inquiry during Plato’s time, though it is not much discussed in present-day Western philosophical circles. The dialogue here is between Hermogenes and Cratylus, but Socrates does much of the talking. Plato has Socrates considering etymological examinations of a long list of names of Gods, humans, and things in order to discover the ultimate truth about things through their names. This dialogue demonstrates that Socrates was an expert in this crowded field of study.

Hermogenes is the conventional linguist. He believes that any local or national convention determines the name of a thing. He feels that the same thing can be called by a different name if people can agree. Cratylus is a naturalistic linguist. He believes that names cannot be chosen arbitrarily. The name must belong to a thing and must have specificity.

Hermogenes and Cratylus are having a discussion about names and ask Socrates to join in. Why is an item or a person called by an assigned name? Cratylus believes that there is an etymological derivative for all given names, whereas Hermogenes believes that a name is anything that a community wishes to call something. Hermogenes first asks Cratylus whether his name is Cratylus, to which Cratylus replies affirmatively. Then Hermogenes asks Socrates whether his name is Socrates, to which Socrates also replies affirmatively. Then Cratylus jokingly says that he himself is called Hermogenes by everyone. When Hermogenes challenges Socrates about Cratylus’ remark, Socrates does not give a straight answer. He explains that there is an ancient proverb stating that fine things are difficult to explain. Socrates tells Hermogenes that Cratylus is only making fun of him. It was a pun on his name. Hermes is the God of profit and Hermogenes means son of Hermes. Socrates points out that Hermogenes was not making much money giving speeches.

Hermogenes says that he has often discussed names with other people who contend that the correctness of a name is determined by usage.

Any name someone gives becomes the correct name by usage. If an object or person gets a different name, then that new name becomes the proper name. Hermogenes gives an example of a domestic slave who had a previous name but was then given a new name. The new name becomes his true name. Socrates then asks if he should decide to call a man – a horse and a horse a man – whether that would be acceptable? The three of them discuss how even in Greece, different communities have different names for the same thing. Socrates then quotes Protagoras, a fellow philosopher, who has said that “man is the measure of all things.” and “that things are to me as they appear to me and to you as they appear to you.” Socrates then asks: “Do you believe that things have a fixed being of their own?” Hermogenes replies that he does not always agree with Protagoras, however, sometimes, even when he does not believe in him he accepts Protagoras’ ideas. They all then agree that there are both, men who are good and wise, as well as men who are bad and foolish. If names for each person are as he believes them to be, then it is not possible for one person to be wise and another foolish. Therefore, what Protagoras says cannot be true.

Socrates and Hermogenes discuss how they should go about properly naming things. Socrates suggests that perhaps Hermogenes should ask his brother Callias what he has learned from Protagoras after paying him such huge fees. Hermogenes declines this suggestion, as he does not believe in what Protagoras has to say. In that case, Socrates suggests, that Hermogenes may want to fall back on what Homer has said on the subject. They discuss multiple examples from Homer that describe names. Homer describes two names given to Hector’s son; men call him Astyanax, and women call him Skamandrios. Men were wiser. When one looks at the roots of the two names, astu and anax, both mean lord of the city. Homer also gave Hector his name. Hector means possessor. This discussion goes to show that Homer was well versed in connectedness in giving names. Socrates gives many more such examples of the correctness of names. He considers that some people’s names are deceptive. Sometimes these names are given to people because their ancestors had them. At other times the names are given in hopes that they will prove to be appropriate for the recipient. As examples he cites Eutychides – son of good fortune, Sosias – savior, and Theophilus – beloved by god. However, these names can be very misleading in describing the so named person.

Their discussion continues about how The Gods were named. The first inhabitants of Greece believed that the sun, moon, earth, stars, and sky were Gods. As these celestial bodies seemed to be always moving or running, they were called, theoi, from thein, to run.

Next, the meaning of daemons, heroes, and humans are discussed. Socrates asks as to what is the correct derivation of the word, daemon? He quotes the poet Hesiod who defined them as “they belonged to the Golden Race of men, the first human race.” They were good and beloved by The Gods and the children of The Gods. According to Hesiod when a good man dies he goes on to a great destiny and with great honors and becomes a daemon, a title then given to him. Hermogenes asks the meaning of the title, hero? Socrates replies that that is easy to explain. Heroes are born out of love, eroes and are thus demigods. They are the children of Gods and mortal women or, conversely, from mortal men with Goddesses. He points out that considering the old Attic dialect, makes it clear that hero is only slightly altered from eros. He notes that sophists who make clever speeches are called rhetores and skilled questioners are called eroten. Socrates asks why members of the human race are called human anthroepoi. He says that we often make small changes by adding or subtracting letters or alter the accents in order to change a phrase into a name. He gives as an example, Dii Philos, which means friend of Zeus. To change this into a name we drop the second i and join the words to make the name Diphilos. Another example Socrates puts forth is that among all of the animals, only humans observe things closely, hence the word anthropos meaning one who observes closely is used to define humans.

They also discuss how The Gods were named, and conclude that they were named for the powers they command. They illustrate with the names of several Gods based on their powers.

The discussion next turns to the correctness of the names of several virtues, such as wisdom, comprehension and justice. The three conclude that wisdom is the understanding of motion as it constantly flows. Judgment expresses that to judge is to examine and study and that is how the virtues were named. They examine the roots of the Attic dialect for derivation of the names for all the virtues and vices. Socrates adds that in his view all names are derived from a thought. Hermogenes agrees with this derivation.

Next they considered how that slight changes made to a name can reverse its meaning. Finally, they concluded there is only one type of correctness in all names, namely to express the nature of a things. The question arises of how someone without a voice or tongue could express names. They conclude that it would be by gesture of hands, head, or the whole body. Socrates says that the correctness of a name is displayed by its nature, an assertion to which Cratylus agrees. Socrates adds that names are spoken in order to give information, and they all agree with this definition. They also agree that the craft of naming things or a person is performed by those we call the rule-setters. Some names and their rule-setters are better than others. Cratylus disagrees that some rule-setters create better names, and also that some names are better than others. He believes that all names have been correctly given and that therefore, all objects have well-given names. Socrates asks if Cratylus believes that names are conventional signs that express things, or if they represent ideas to those who already know these things, or if they were ideas before conventions were established? Socrates contends that the correctness of a name lies in its conventionality. Cratylus insists that a name that expresses something is superior to a name given by chance. He adds that anyone who knows a thing’s name also knows that thing. Socrates contends that anyone who investigates things by considering only their names as a guide may be deceived. The name-giver might have given the thing a name based on a mistaken conception of the thing. Cratylus disagrees, saying that the name-giver must have known the thing before deciding on a name for that thing. Socrates does not agree. He argues that, if things cannot be learned except from their names, then how did the name-giver give the first name before he knew the thing. Cratylus acknowledges the point and adds that more than human power gave the first names, and so they are necessarily correct. Socrates predicts that there will be civil war between names given by humans and those by Gods. They all agreed that it is better to investigate things and learn about them through themselves, rather than to do so through their names.

6 Theaetetus

Overview: The dialogue can be dated as it mentions the return of the mortally sick and wounded Theaetetus from Corinth after the Peloponnesian War, on his way to Athens. This dialogue is being read by a slave from a book written by Euclides. The book is a transcription of the conversation many years ago between Theaetetus, Theodorus the geometer, and Socrates. It is a primary dialogue on epistemology, which is the study of what knowledge is. Epistemology was a main preoccupation of the ancient philosophers and this, perhaps, is the greatest work ever composed on the subject. Most of this book is in the form of a question and answer dialogue between Socrates and Theaetetus. They wish to understand the nature of knowledge. Socrates likens himself to the midwife who helps women deliver their babies. In this dialogue he will again act as a midwife and help Theaetetus deliver his thoughts on what is knowledge. First they look at various crafts as knowledge, but reject this approach as it describes knowledge “of ” rather than what knowledge “is.” They then put forward three significant hypotheses. First, perception is knowledge. Perception is obtained from the senses, but maybe perceived differently by different people. Thus, perception cannot be knowledge. Another possibility is that true judgment is knowledge. This definition, too, is rejected because, as with perception, judgments may be due to sensory awareness. Sensations are the source of all belief, but as true or false beliefs cannot be determined, true judgment is difficult to define. Thus true judgment cannot be knowledge. Finally knowledge is defined as true judgment with an account. This proposition is also known as Socrates’ Dream Theory, as he narrates it as a dream that he has had. This definition is also rejected as there cannot be an account for false belief. All three suggestions are discussed in detail, but eventually all are rejected. In the end, in frustration, Socrates concludes that all they have produced is “wind – eggs.” It was an aporetic discussion. Meaning that it ended in an inconclusive impasse, as all the suggestions offered were ultimately inadequate. Plato does not provide an answer to what knowledge is, though he does show what it is not.

Euclides and Terpsion meet at the market place in Megra. Euclides reports that he was at the harbor where he met Theaetetus, who was being taken to Athens from his camp at Corinth during the Peloponnesian War. He was badly wounded on the battlefield but felt worse now, as he was also suffering from dysentery. Euclides related that he had heard people singing Theaetetus’ praises because of how valiantly he fought. Terpsion comments that he would have been more surprised had it been otherwise. Euclides says that he tried to persuade Theaetetus to stay in Megra until he had recovered from his illness, but Theaetetus was in a hurry to get home to Athens. Euclides then reminisced about Socrates having met Theaetetus when Theaetetus was a young man. After a discussion with Theaetetus, Socrates predicted that Theaetetus would have much to say when he was grownup. Terpsion concurs that Socrates was correct in his assessment of the young Theaetetus and asks what Theaetetus had discussed with Socrates that was so impressive. Euclides says that he wrote down the whole discussion from memory in a book and then checked the details with Socrates whenever he was not sure of his own memory. This discussion was between Theodorus the geometer, Theaetetus and Socrates.

Euclides then has his slave read the book to them. In this book Socrates begins by asking Theodorus if he has come across any students worthy of note? Theodorus replies that he has indeed. He speaks of an extremely gifted young man called Theaetetus who has facial features very similar to Socrates’. While the two men are conversing, they see Theaetetus walking towards them. Socrates has Theodorus ask Theaetetus to join them in conversation.

Socrates tells Theaetetus that, because Theodorus told him that Theaetetus’ face looks like his own, he would like to see what sort of face Theaetetus has. They agree that it is necessary that they look into this claim. Socrates adds that Theodorus has never praised anyone as he has praised Theaetetus, so they must look into that as well. Socrates begins by asking Theaetetus if he was learning geometry from Theodorus. Theaetetus replies that this is indeed so and adds that he is also being tutored in astronomy and arithmetic.

Socrates then confesses that he has some difficulty grasping a few things. For example, he notes that it is said that to learn is to become wiser about the things one is learning and that what makes people wise is wisdom. Therefore, he asks whether wisdom is the same thing as knowledge. To this remark, Theaetetus replies in the affirmative. Socrates now counters that he has difficulty in understanding what knowledge is, and asks whether anyone can explain that to him in a few words. Theaetetus tries to explain that what Theodorus teaches is knowledge such as geometry and all the other subjects. He adds that there are crafts such as cobbling that are also knowledge. Socrates tells him that he had asked for a simple explanation but that all that he received was a variety of examples. Theaetetus responds that he is unable to follow Socrates’ logic. Socrates tries to explain by asking whether talk about cobbling means just the knowledge of shoe making. Theaetetus replies that that is all he means. Socrates asks whether talking about carpentry, means the knowledge of making furniture. Once again Theaetetus says yes. Socrates then states that in both these examples Theaetetus was putting into his definition that which the knowledge encompasses. Theaetetus agrees with this proposition. Then, Socrates tells him that he had asked for something different. He explains that he did not ask what a person can have knowledge of; but he wants to know what knowledge itself is. Theaetetus says that he understands, prompting Socrates to give another example. He points out that if he had asked what clay is, and Theaetetus had answered the clay of potters, and the clay of brick makers, and the clay of the stove makers, those responses would be absurd. Theaetetus hesitantly agrees with this conclusion by Socrates. Socrates then emphasizes his response, saying that the person would not understand anything when he does not know what that thing (in this case, clay) is. Therefore, listing all the users of clay does not help in understanding what clay is. Thus, it follows that a man who does not understand what knowledge is will not understand the knowledge of shoes either. Furthermore, a man who does not understand what knowledge is will not understand what cobbling, or indeed any other craft, is. Socrates further emphasizes that when the question at hand is what knowledge is, to reply by naming one of the crafts is absurd. Such an answer points out something about what the knowledge might encompass, but does not answer the question of what knowledge is. Socrates adds that the best way to answer a query about the nature of clay is to say that it is a mixture of earth with liquid and point out whose clay it is.