PLATO
The Visitor suggests that they use this model to understand what makes a sophist. He asks whether the sophist is an expert. Theaetetus asserts that as the name sophist suggests being wise, it implies some type of expertise. So both the angler and the sophist have knowledge. The Visitor suggests that both the sophist and the angler appear to be hunters. After multiple such deductions, the Visitor claims that the sophist will be classified as a wage-earner. He is agreeable to people and earns wages by what could be called flattery. When this kind of wage earning teaches virtue to people, the teacher could be called a sophist: a person who deals with knowledge, its acquisition, and sale. A sophist has expertise in debating and appears in many different forms. Examples include a hunter hired by a group of rich young men, a wholesaler and a retailer of learning about the soul, a seller of his own learning, and an expert in verbal combat called debating. The sophist cleanses souls of beliefs that interfere with learning. No one can know everything, but sophists know about things that they dispute. To their students they appear to be wise about everything, without actually being wise. So the sophist has belief and knowledge about everything but does not possess truth. Thus, he must be regarded as a cheat and an imitator.
The Visitor continues, saying that a sophist is deceptive about appearances and so is an expert at deception. He is an expert at cheating and telling falsehoods. The sophist can make young people believe that they are wiser than everyone else. The sophist says this because if they did not look wise, then no one would be willing to pay to listen to their wisdom. If a person is expert in only one thing, but promises to make everything clear, then he is trying to fool everyone. Thus, he is one of those people who play games. He is a cheat and an imitator. At this point the Visitor divides the sophist’s actions into two parts, likeness-making and appearance-making, a difficult distinction. Examples of this distinction include appearing and seeming but not being, saying things but not true things, and uttering these things without being caught up in verbal combat. The Visitor then asks Theaetetus how a person would employ the words: “that which is not.” Theaetetus finds the question confusing. The Visitor replies that it is obvious that: “that which is not” cannot be applied to that: “which is”. He further says that this terminology cannot be applied to “that which” and thus it will not be right to apply it to: “something.” This “something” is always applied to a being, so a person saying something must be saying the same one thing. Someone who does not say something is not saying anything at all. Such a person speaks but says nothing. The Visitor then goes into a long exposition delving into the concepts of: “that which is not and those which are and also of being and not being”.
In the end, all those present conclude that a sophist only imitates the production of contrary speech. He is insincere and unknowing. He is a juggler of words. He is human and not divine, earning a living by clever debating.
8 Statesman
Overview: This dialogue follows the one called Sophist. The whole dialogue, if it can be called a dialogue, is dominated by the Visitor from Elea. As in the Sophist Dialogue the Visitor remains unnamed. In those times, Parmenides was the principle sophist in the City of Elea and it appears that Plato did not always agree with him. The interlocutor, called young Socrates, is very much like the student Theaetetus in the Sophist dialogue. He always agrees with the visitor and never once asks an intelligent question.
A statesman is a person who, by virtue of his knowledge, governs the City-State. Statesmanship requires knowledge to govern wisely, but none of the three modes of government prevalent at that time namely: kingship, aristocracy, or democracy, brings out the true statesman. None of the city rulers of Greece at that time possessed that quality. The best that citizens could hope for was a government based on a set of written rules, e.g., a constitution. When such rules are disregarded, as they often were in those times, then the government becomes a tyranny.
The discussants in this dialogue start with the original intention of finding out what specific knowledge a sophist, statesman or philosopher has. It is interesting that Plato never wrote the third dialogue about what defines a philosopher and so the question remains open, why he did not do so? It may be that he left it as a challenge for the reader to decide what qualities are required to be a philosopher.
Socrates, Theodorus and the visitor from Elea meet again to continue their discussion of what is implied by the titles Sophist, Statesman, and Philosopher. Along with them are young Theaetetus and the young Socrates, a namesake of the elder. Having completed their discussion regarding sophists, they consider what they should discuss next. They leave the choice to the Visitor, who chooses to discuss the statesman. The Visitor suggests that they should let Theaetetus rest this time and have young Socrates answer the questions. Everyone in the group agrees.
The Visitor begins by asking if they should consider the statesman to be someone possessing knowledge or whether they should start with a different assumption. Young Socrates proposes that considering a statesman as someone possessing knowledge is a good starting place for their discussion. The Visitor suggests that they should consider different sorts of knowledge as they had done when discussing the sophist.
The Visitor starts by claiming that arithmetic is a type of expert knowledge. It does not involve practical action but only provides knowledge. Skills such as carpentry involve an expert knowledge, but they also require a practical knowledge in the creation of objects. Based on this condition, the Visitor suggests that they divide knowledge into two classes, theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge. Young Socrates agrees that these two divisions are parts of the single concept of knowledge. The Visitor asks if it is appropriate to say that the statesman and the king on the one hand and the slave-master and the household manager on the other are also one thing. Young Socrates questions why the Visitor makes this division. The Visitor asks that if a person who is in private practice advises a doctor who is in public employment, should both be called by the same professional title? Young Socrates believes that this would be proper. The Visitor proceeds to ask that if this is so, then someone who is himself a private citizen, but is clever enough to advise the king, (although the king should have had that knowledge by virtue of his position), then is that person who passes that knowledge, whether private citizen or king, an expert on kingship? Once again young Socrates concurs. The Visitor then adds that, similarly, the household manager and the slave-master are the same thing. Likewise, there should be no difference between the ruler of a large household and the ruler of a city. Once again young Socrates agrees. The Visitor then summarizes that there is only one sort of expert knowledge, whether it is knowledge of kingship, or of statesmanship, or of household management.
For the king to maintain power, does not require the use of his hands or body, only the use of his mental powers. A king’s powers, thus, are more aligned with theoretical knowledge than with practical knowledge. The statesman, too, will fall into the same category, namely as a possessor of theoretical knowledge. The Visitor now wants to discuss what theoretical knowledge is. He reminds his listeners that they have already agreed that there is such a thing as calculations, to which young Socrates also agrees. The visitor then adds that such calculations would be part of a theoretical type of expertise. Once one recognizes the differences among the various numbers, there is not much left to do with or discuss about them. Master builders do not function as workers but rather they manage other workers. A master builder provides the understanding but not the labor, and therefore possesses theoretical knowledge. The Visitor categorizes two types of knowledge, one that makes judgments and one that serves to direct others in their activities. The Visitor asks whether kingship would fall in the category of making judgments or in that of directing others. Young Socrates chooses the later. Now the Visitor wants to examine the concept of directing others, which he further divides into two categories. He gives as an example, a retail dealer who sells goods manufactured by others and a dealer who sells self-produced goods. A king, he claims falls into the class of those who sell self-produced goods.
The Visitor continues, giving several examples that divide all new answers into two subdivisions. He also wants to consider the two aspects of a person who cares for humans, whether doing so is enforced or voluntary. If such service is enforced, it would be the result of tyranny, while if it is voluntary it would more likely be the result of statesmanship. The Visitor notes, and young Socrates agrees, that it is a universal experience that not recognizing something makes it appear to be strange. The greatest magician of all, the sophist, who plays with words, is the most versed in this art.
The Visitor says that monarchy is one variety of knowledge that rules the cities. Young Socrates agrees. They then discuss a variety of governmental knowledge that arises in situation in which power is held by a few wealthy people. This type of governance is an aristocracy. Finally a third type of knowledge, the exercise of power by the masses via a ballot, called democracy. Monarchy may be tyrannical or benevolent. Power which is held by a small group of wealthy men may be an aristocracy or an oligarchy. Democracy managed by the masses may be by force or general consent. These are the three modes of ruling. As was discussed previously, kingly rule is based on some sort of expert knowledge and not on power, wealth or general consent. The Visitor asserts that no large collection of people is capable of acquiring any sort of expert knowledge. Thus, he notes, if some sort of kingly expert knowledge does exist, then for example a collection of people such as the wealthy, or all of the common people acting together, can acquire expert knowledge or statesmanship. One man with expert knowledge, ruling alone, must never do anything contrary to the written laws. If the rich follow this principle, then the state is called an aristocracy, while if they take no notice of the law the state will be called an oligarchy. When one person rules according to the laws, he imitates a person with expert knowledge and we call him king. When that ruler does not act according to the laws he is called a tyrant. The Visitor then presents another suggestion. If everything were performed on the basis of the written laws, and not on various sorts of expert knowledge, then the person selected to enforce and follow those laws rules accordingly. If that ruler were to ignore these precepts he would commit a great mistake and injustice. The person who possesses the art of statesmanship may do many things without taking notice of the written law, based on the concept that it is better for those who are ruled to be doing what a true expert on the laws should do. Thus if such kingly expert knowledge does exist, then neither the collection of rich people nor the masses will ever acquire such knowledge. Only the one person who possesses the expert knowledge will be called king.
The Visitor asks which combination of traits will be the best for the people. He presents the three possibilities again: rule by monarchy, rule by a collection of wealthy people, or rule by a collection of the masses. The Visitor again goes through his process of dividing every thing into two classes. This discussion leads to the conclusion that the one who possesses the art of kingship, is a statesman and lives by the written laws. However, it is not easy to find such a person. In other words, it is difficult to find a statesman.
9 Parmenides
Overview: This dialogue is one of the most difficult of all Plato’s body of work to understand. It has confused and confounded philosophy pundits for centuries. Perhaps the concepts behind it are no longer an active part of the human experience. Even Aristotle, Plato’s most famous pupil, refuted Plato’s Theory of Forms.
The dialogue, Parmenides, is presented as an account of a meeting thrice removed. The initial meeting takes place at Pythodorous’ house. Here, Zeno reads his new book on Unity and Plurality in the presence of Parmenides, Socrates and a young man named Aristotle, who is not the philosopher we know. Rather, he is the one who later in life became one of the Thirty Tyrants who ruled Athens after the Peloponnesian Wars. The venerable Parmenides is sixty-five years old and Zeno, his protege, is forty years old; both are from the city of Elea. Socrates is twenty and Aristotle is younger still. The book under discussion, the “Theories of Unity and Plurality” is now lost to us. The discussion was memorized by Pythodorous, who then recited it to Antiphon, half-brother of Plato. In turn, Antiphon has memorized it and then recites it to Cephalus for the present dialogue.
In this dialogue, Parmenides rather than the usual Socrates, who is described as young and not mature enough, is Plato’s spokesman. Here, Plato describes his Theory of Forms. Zeno has argued that, if there are many things, then all of them will be both alike (similar) and unalike (different), but such a condition is an impossible contradiction. This uncertainty disappears if one separates, on the one hand the Form of sensible things, from, on the other hand, both the Forms of alike and unalike things. So the same things can be both alike and unalike by being both in the Forms of alikeness and unalikeness. Here is a brief description of Forms: A chair is a Form but there are wooden chairs, leather chairs, metal chairs, four-legged chairs, and three-legged chairs. In one sense these types of chairs are all unalike, while in a contrary sense they still are alike, as they all are chairs, objects used to sit upon. Parmenides points out that Socrates has made the distinction between Forms and Sensibles. Socrates says that he can recognize mathematical, ethical, and aesthetic Forms such as Unity, Plurality, Goodness, and Beauty. However he is unsure about the Forms of Man, Fire and Water and those of objects such as hair, mud and dirt. Socrates is brushed aside by Parmenides as being too immature to understand.
The discussion continues with several arguments put forward with regards to the concept of Forms in Unity and in Plurality. For example, existence in a single Form for, Largeness or Smallness. Such categories suggest that each Form is a thought existing in a soul. If this placement is correct, then a thought must be considered as something that is a Form. The argument changes as Forms are taken to be patterns in nature. Later, Parmenides says that Forms exist only in their relationship to each other. Socrates is unable to follow all these arguments, but Parmenides brushes him aside and blames his lack of understanding on his immaturity.
The second part of the dialogue presents Aristotle as Parmenides’ interlocutor. The two of them consider the subject, “if oneness is.” If one has no beginning, center, or end, then oneness is part of all being and vice-versa. Now, if oneness is not a separate entity then it participates in everything different from an entity. So everything is partially one.
Scholars over the years have been unable to satisfactorily characterize this dialogue. No credible understanding is available, though the topic of Forms as the theory of Unity was very dear to Plato.
Cephalus arrives in Athens from his home in Clazomanae, and meets Adeimantus and Glaucon in the marketplace. Adeimantus asks Cephalus if there is any thing he can do for him. Cephalus answers that the real reason he made the trip was to ask for a favor from him. They talk about Antiphon, who had met a friend of Zeno’s called Pythodorous. Pythodorous can recite from memory the discussion Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, and Aristotle once had, as he had heard it many times from Pythodorous and now Antiphon can also recite it from memory. Cephalus says that he would like to hear about that discussion. Adeimantus replies that this request should not be difficult to fulfill, and they all walk to nearby Antiphon’s house. After some initial hesitation Antiphon agrees to the request.
Antiphon tells them that at the time of the discussion, Parmenides was about sixty-five years old, Zeno was about forty, and Socrates was twenty. All three gathered to hear about Zeno’s book, The Theories of Unity and Plurality. They also had the namesake of Aristotle in their company, the youngest of them all; the man, who later in life, after Athens lost the war with Sparta, became one of the Thirty Tyrants who ruled Athens. Parmenides was initially outside the room when Zeno started to read his book out loud but joined them later. After Zeno finished reading his book, Socrates asked him to repeat his first argument. Then he asked Zeno what he means when he says that things that are many must be both alike and unalike. Socrates states that such a classification is impossible because things that are unalike cannot be things that are like each other, nor can things that are alike be unalike. Socrates asks Zeno whether he had misunderstood his statements. Parmenides intervenes, observing that actually Zeno is saying the same thing that Socrates had previously said, only changing it around a little. Parmenides adds that Socrates, had said before, that all is one, and he gives an excellent proof for that proposition. Zeno says that this proof is not sufficient and gives several proofs of his own. Hence, Parmenides argues that with one thing being “oneness” and the other “not many,” they both in essence mean the same thing. Socrates then asks if there is a Form that is itself-byitself. A thing is itself-by-itself if it is separate from other things. If that is the case, then itself, means apart and on its own. In another sense itself-by-itself also means responsible for its own being, independent of other things. Thus, itself means because of itself and that there is one Form, itself-by-itself of likeness, with an opposite Form for what unalike is. Therefore, of the things called many they get a share of both alikeness and unalikeness. Socrates adds that it would not be astonishing if he says he is both one thing and many things at the same time: When I want to show that I am many, I point out that my right side is different from my left side and that I have upper and lower parts. On the other hand, when I want to show that I am one, I note that I am one of the seven of us now present in this room. This analysis shows that I am both one and many. Hence, both of you apparently mean practically the same thing, but it appears that what you have said is not understood by some of us.
Zeno claims that the book is in defense of Parmenides’ argument against those who make fun of it, as many absurdities result from the argument “if it is one”. Socrates tells Zeno that he accepts this point, but then asks if there is a Form itself-by-itself of alikeness, a Form that is apart on its own. Also another Form opposite to this, which is what unalike is. He further asks how what is called “many” can get a share of these entities. When Socrates finishes his question, Parmenides praises him for his understanding. Parmenides also distinguishes certain Forms being separate, which also separate the things that partake of them with alikeness itself being something separate. Parmenides asks him if there is a Form, itself-by-itself, of the Just, the Beautiful, the Good and other such things. Socrates replies in the affirmative. Then Parmenides asks about human beings and whether there is a separate Form for them or for all those others similar to them? He extends this question and asks whether there is a Form itself of Human Being, or of Fire, or of Water? Socrates replies that he doubts that such a Form exists or that he would talk about Form in this context in the same way.
Parmenides further asks about things that at first may seem absurd, such as hair, mud, or dust. Does Socrates doubt whether there are separate Forms for each of these? Socrates replies that he has no such doubts. He adds that these Forms are just as we see them, if it is not so, he avers that he might fall into a pit of nonsense. Parmenides responds that this interpretation is correct, but, because Socrates is still young, he will take notice of it when he is older and will consider nothing beneath his notice. Parmenides then asks Socrates whether he still believes that there are certain Forms that derive their names from having a share of alikeness, for example the Form of the Large by getting a share of Largeness, and the Beautiful Form by getting a share of Beauty? To this question Socrates replies in the affirmative. Parmenides adds that all characteristics are what they are in relation to the controlled and have their being in relation to themselves but not in relation to things that belong to us. It is by people partaking of these that they get their various names.
All those present are confounded by this discussion and ask Parmenides to go through the whole of his argument again, so as to explain his theories. After much hesitation Parmenides eventually agrees to do so. The group selects the youngest amongst them, Aristotle, to be his interlocutor.
Parmenides starts by declaring that, if an object is one, then one can not be many. Aristotle agrees with this hypothesis. Parmenides continues, saying that, if this is so, then there cannot be a part of the object nor can the object be whole, a conclusion that Aristotle questions. Parmenides then poses the query, if a part is a part of the whole, then what is a whole? He answers his own question. It would be something from which no part is missing. Therefore, in any case, the one thing would be composed of parts, both if it is whole and/or if it is composed of parts. Aristotle agrees with this definition. Parmenides then says that in both cases the one would be many rather than one. Aristotle also agrees with this definition. Parmenides adds that nonetheless, it must not be many but one. Therefore if one is to be one, then it can be neither whole nor have parts. If it does not have parts, then it cannot either have a beginning nor an end nor a middle, as these would be parts. Furthermore, a beginning and an end are limits, so as it can have neither, such an object would be unlimited. Therefore, it would be without shape, as it is neither round nor straight. This then also means that it would be nowhere.
In a similar manner Parmenides continues this line of argument over the supposition “if oneness is” for a considerable time. Parmenides attempts to sum up the argument by saying that “if oneness does not exist,” then things other than the one do exist. Others things will not be one and surely they will not be many unalike, since oneness would be present in things that are many. If none of these is one, he continues, they are all nothing, so they also cannot be many. If oneness is not present in others, they are neither many nor one. Neither are they one of many. They do not belong to any Form as they have no parts. So if oneness does not exist, none of the alike can be one or many, since without oneness it is impossible to conceive of many. Therefore, if oneness is not, otherness neither is, nor is conceived to be one or many. Hence they are neither alike nor unalike. To sum up, “if one does not exist, then nothing does.”
10 Philebus
Overview: Readers of this dialogue will find that they start in the middle of the discussion that Socrates is having with Philebus. As the reader enters, Philebus gives up his place in the ongoing discussion with Socrates to Protarchus. Later, when Socrates and Protarchus end the discussion, Protarchus remarks that they have not finished, and there are points he wants to discuss further at a later time. The modality where the thread of the dialogue is picked up in the middle is known as “in mediis rebus” or “in medias res.” The dialogue both begins and ends in the same fashion.